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The federal black lung program' was enacted as a result of
congressional dissatisfaction with the ability of state workers'
compensation laws to adequately compensate miners with pneu-
moconiosis. 2 However, as it now exists, the program is derived
from four statutes,3 administered by two federal agencies, 4 through
three sets of regulations,5 and has been referred to by courts as
a "legislative morass, ' 6 a "statutory muddle ' 7 and, in a rather
understated manner, as simply "not represent[ing] the work of
Congress at its most lucid." '
* Member District of Columbia Bar; B.A., University of Arizona, 1983; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1986. The author is presently a litigation attorney in
the Special Appellate and Supreme Court Litigation Division of the Solicitor's Office and
formerly worked in the Black Lung Benefits Division of the Office of the Solicitor, U.S.
Department of Labor. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of
the author. They do not reflect the official position of the United States Department of
Labor. Moreover, this article is based upon public information and not upon any confidential
source or information internal to the Solicitor's Office or the Department of Labor.
1 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982).
2 See House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor, Legislative
History of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 680, 904-906 (1970); 115 CONG. REc.
39995-39999 (1969) (remarks of Senator Javits).
I Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
83 Stat. 792 (1969); Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 153
(1972); Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978);
Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1982); see
also Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1978).
* Part B claims are administered by the Department of Health and Human Services
(formally Health, Education and Welfare) through the Social Security Administration, while
Part C claims are administered by the Department of Labor. See infra notes 11 & 12 and
accompanying text.
1 20 C.F.R. Parts 410, 718 and 727 (1988).
6 U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Webb, 595 F.2d 264, 265 (5th Cir. 1979).
7 Krolick Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 558 F.2d 685, 686 (3d Cir.
1977).
, Director, OWCP v. Bivens, 757 F.2d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1985).
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Pittston Coal Group
v. Sebben,9 which will impact hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
pending black lung claims, reflects this statutory and regulatory
complexity. It is the purpose of this article to explain the impact
and limits of Sebben, including related issues left unresolved by
the decision. To do so, it is necessary to carefully examine the
decision itself and untangle the interwinding provisions upon which
it is based.
In Part I, this article will set forth the statutory and regulatory
background and discuss the lower court decisions leading up to
the Supreme Court's decision in Sebben. Part II will discuss the
Sebben decision itself. Part III will describe the impact and limits
of this decision and discuss, in some detail, the major related
issue which was left unresolved by Sebben. The article concludes,
in Part IV, with a brief discussion of what the author believes is
the most logical resolution of this unresolved aspect of the Sebben
litigation.
I. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 196910 to establish a black lung benefits program
for coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis
and for surviving dependents of miners whose death was due to
pneumoconiosis. Under Title IV, claims filed prior to December
31, 1973, were to be administered under Part B of the Act, by
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare [HEW]." Claims
filed after December 31, 1973, on the other hand, were to be
administered under Part C of the Act, by the Secretary of Labor.
2
- 109 S.Ct. 414 (1988).
10 Pub. L. No. 91-173, Title IV, 83 Stat. 792 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1970))
[hereinafter cited as Title I.
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 921-25 (1970).
,2 More specifically, claims filed after this date were to be filed under the appropriate
state workers' compensation law if the law had been approved by the Secretary of Labor.
If no approved state law existed in the state in which the miner had been employed and,
to date, no such laws have been approved, the claim was to be filed with the Secretary of
Labor, adjudicated by the Secretary pursuant to incorporated provisions of the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and paid by the claimant's coal mine
employer. 30 U.S.C. §§ 931-36 (1970). See also 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-52 (Supp. 11 1978). If the
coal mine employer was insolvent, bankrupt, or otherwise could not be identified, the Act
authorized the Secretary to pay approved claims with federal funds. 30 U.S.C. § 934 (1970).
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In an attempt to liberalize the entitlement provisions for black
lung benefits, Congress amended Title IV in 1972.13 Thereafter,
HEW promulgated Section 410.490, an "interim" regulation ap-
plicable, by its terms, only to Part B claims.' 4 This regulation
13 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 743, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 9-16,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2305, 2317-20; H.R. REP. No. 460, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
" 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b) (1988). This interim regulation was promulgated by HEW
in response to congressional concern about a large existing backlog of claims and the
unavailability of medical testing facilities to evaluate claimants. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director,
OWCP, 108 S. Ct. 427, 436-37 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(a). In its entirety, the interim
regulation provides:
(b) Interim presumption. With respect to a miner who files a claim for
benefits before July 1, 1973, and with respect to a survivor of a miner who
dies before January 1, 1974, when such survivor timely files a claim for
benefits, such miner will be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumo-
coniosis, or to have been totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time
of his death, or his death will be presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis, as
the case may be, if:
(1) One of the following medical requirements is met:
(i) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy or autopsy establishes the
existence of pneumoconiosis (see § 410.428); or
(ii) In the case of a miner employed for at least 15 years in underground
or comparable coal mine employment, ventilatory studies establish the presence
of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease (which meets the requirements
for duration in § 410.412 (a)(2)) as demonstrated by values which are equal
to or less than the values specified in the following table:
Equal to or less than-
FEV 1 MVV
67" or less ................................................ 2.3 92
68" ....................................................... 2.4 96
69" . ...................................................... 2.4 96
70" . ...................................................... 2.5 100
71" ...................................................... 2.6 104
72" . ...................................................... 2.6 104
73" or m ore .............................................. 2.7 108
(2) The impairment established in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of
this section arose out of coal mine employment (see §§ 410.416 and 410.456).
(3) With respect to a miner who meets the medical requirements in
paragraph (b)(l)(ii) of this section, he will be presumed to be totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment, or to have been
totally disabled at the time of his death due to pneumoconiosis arising out of
such employment, or his death will be presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis
arising out of such employment, as the case may be, if he has at least 10
years of the requisite coal mine employment.
(c) Rebuttal of presumption. The presumption in paragraph (b) of this
section may be rebutted if:
(1) There is evidence that the individual is, in fact, doing his usual coal
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provided a rebuttable presumption that a miner was totally disa-
bled due to pneumoconiosis where the claimant established pneu-
moconiosis by x-ray, biopsy or autopsy evidence and established
that the pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment. 5
The regulation also provided that a claimant who was employed
as a miner for either 10 or 15 years and who presented qualifying
ventilatory study evidence was entitled to the presumption. 6 Once
invoked, the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the
miner was doing his or her usual coal mine work or comparable
work or was able to do sO.
17
In 1978, Congress again amended the Act, directing the Sec-
retary of Labor to "establish criteria for all appropriate medical
tests ... which accurately reflect total disability in coal miners.I
18
Congress also instructed the Secretary to reopen claims that had
been denied prior to the effective date of the 1978 amendments. 19
mine work, or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1)), or
(2) Other evidence, including physical performance tests (where such tests
are available and their administration is not contraindicated), establish that
the individual is able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable and
gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1)).
(d) Application of presumption on readjudication. Any claim initially
adjudicated under the rules in this section will, if the claim is for any reason
thereafter readjudicated, be readjudicated under the same rules.
(e) Failure of miner to qualify under presumption in paragraph (b) of
this section. Where it is not established on the basis of the presumption in
paragraph (b) of this section that a miner is (or was) totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis, or was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time
of his death, or that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, the claimant may
nevertheless establish the requisite disability or cause of death of the miner
under the rules set out in §§ 410.412 to 410.462.
20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(i) (1988).
6 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(3)(10 years); 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(ii)(15 years). In
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S.Ct. 414, 428 (1988), the dissent argued that this
discrepancy was due to a typographical error. As written, paragraph (b)(3) inexplicably
requires miners who have already had to prove 15 years of coal mine employment pursuant
to subparagraph (b)(l)(ii), to also prove 10 years of coal mine employment. Although none
of the parties had argued this explanation, the dissent. reasoned that the reference to
subparagraph (b)(1)(i) was a scrivener's error and that, in fact, the 10 year requirement in
paragraph (b)(3) of the regulation was meant to apply to miners who had established x-ray
evidence of pneumoconiosis in accordance with subparagraph (b)(l)(i). Id. at 428-29. The
issue of whether a miner with qualifying ventilatory study evidence must establish 10 or 15
years of coal mine employment may be reached by the Benefits Review Board in the pending
case of Barlow v. Kitchekan Fuel Corp., BRB No. 89-1228 (the employer filed its Petition
for Review and brief in the case on June 29, 1989).
20 C.F.R. § 410.490(c)(1), (2) (1988).
IS Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 2(c), 92 Stat. 95;
30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(l)(D) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
29 30 U.S.C. § 945 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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In adjudicating these reopened claims, Congress instructed, in
Section 902(f)(2) of the Act, that the criteria the Department of
Labor applied were to "not be more restrictive than the criteria
applicable to a claim filed on June 30, 1973. ' 20 The Secretary
promulgated the Part 727 regulations in response to this man-
date.
2
30 U.S.C. § 902(0(2) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
, 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1988). The full text of this regulation is as follows:
§ 727.203 Interim presumption.
(a) Establishing interim presumption. A miner who engaged in coal mine
employment for at least 10 years will be presumed to be totally disabled due
to pneumoconiosis, or to have been totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis
at the time of death, or death will be presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis,
arising out of that employment, if one of the following medical requirements
is met:
(1) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autopsy establishes the
existence of pneumoconiosis (see § 410.428 of this title);
(2) Ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic respiratory or
pulmonary disease (which meets the requirements for duration in § 410.412(a)(2)
of this title) as demonstrated by values which are equal to or less than the
values specified in the following table:
Equal to or less than-
FEV I MVV
67" or less ................................................ 2.3 92
68" . ...................................................... 2.4 96
69" . ...................................................... 2.4 96
70" . ...................................................... 2.5 100
71" . ...................................................... 2.6 104
72" . ...................................................... 2.6 104
73" or m ore .............................................. 2.7 108
(3) Blood gas studies which demonstrate the presence of an impairment
in the transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood as indicated by
values which are equal to or less than the values specified in the following
table:
Arterial pO2  Arterial pCO2
equal
to or less than
(mm. Hg.)








JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
The Part 727 regulation permits invocation of a presumption
of total disability due to pneumoconiosis based on chest x-ray,
autopsy or biopsy evidence of pneumoconiosis, only if a miner
worked 10 or more years in coal mine employment.3 On the other
hand, the Section 410.490 presumption can be invoked by x-ray,
autopsy or biopsy evidence of pneumoconiosis, without regard to
the length of coal mine employment, so long as the claimant can
prove that the miner's pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine
employment.
21
Plaintiffs in several circuits challenged this difference in op-
eration between the two presumptions, claiming that, for miners
with fewer than 10 years of coal mine employment, the Part 727
regulation violated the "not more restrictive" directive in Section
38 ............................................................................. 62.
39 ............................................................................. 6 1
40-45 ......................................................................... 60
A bove 45 ................................................................... A ny value.
(4) Other medical evidence, including the documented opinion of a
physician exercising reasoned medical judgment, establishes the presence of a
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment;
(5) In the case of a deceased miner where no medical evidence is avail-
able, the affidavit of the survivor of such miner or other persons with
knowledge of the miner's physical condition, demonstrates the presence of a
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment.
(b) Rebuttal of interim presumption. In adjudicating a claim under this
subpart, all relevant medical evidence shall be considered. The presumption
in paragraph (a) of this section shall be rebutted if:
(1) The evidence establishes that the individual is, in fact, doing his
usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1) of
this title); or
(2) In light of all relevant evidence it is established that the individual is
able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see §
410.412(a)(1) of this title); or
(3) The evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the miner
did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment; or
(4) The evidence establishes that the miner does not, or did not, have
pneumoconiosis.
(c) Applicability of Part 718. Except as is otherwise provided in this
section, the provisions of Part 718 of this subchapter as amended from time
to time, shall also be applicable to the adjudication of claims under this
section.
(d) Failure of miner to qualify under the presumption in paragraph (a)
of this section. Where eligibility is not established under this section, such
eligibility may be established under Part 718 of this subchapter as amended
from time to time.
- 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (1988).
20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(i), (2) (1988).
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402(f)(2) of the Act.24 Four circuit courts agreed, holding that, in
such cases, Section 402(f)(2) mandates the application of the less
restrictive Section 410.490 criteria.25 The Seventh Circuit alone
reached a contrary conclusion.
26
Moreover, four named plaintiffs brought a class action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa 7
on behalf of a putative class of claimants who had submitted x-
rays showing the presence of pneumoconiosis, but whose claims
were denied under Part 727 because they did not have 10 or more
years of coal mine employment. The plaintiffs were seeking a writ
of mandamus compelling the Department of Labor to readjudi-
cate these claims under Section 410.490, despite the fact that they
had not appealed the denial of their claims within the statutory
time limits. 28 The district court, however, ruled that mandamus
did not lie and consequently dismissed the claim before deciding
the class certification issue. 29 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit re-
versed on both counts, ordering the lower court to certify the
class and issue a writ of mandamus.3 0 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Eighth Circuit case and consolidated it with two
other cases.3
- 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). The text of this provision is as
follows:
(2) Criteria applied by the Secretary of Labor in the case of
(A) any claim which is subject to review by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, or subject to a determination by the Secretary
of Labor, under Section 945(a) of this title;
(B) any claim which is subject to review by the Secretary of Labor
under Section 945(b) of this title; and
(C) any claim filed on or before the effective date of regulations
promulgated under this subsection by the Secretary of Labor;
shall not be more restrictive than the criteria applicable to a claim filed on
June 30, 1973, whether or not the final disposition of any such claim occurs
after the date of such promulgation of regulations by the Secretary of Labor.
See Kyle v. Director, OWCP, 819 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1987); Broyles v. Director,
OWCP, 824 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1987); Coughlan v. Director, OWCP, 757 F.2d 966 (8th
Cir. 1985); Halon v. Director, OWCP, 713 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983).
See Strike v. Director, OWCP, 817 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1987).
27 Sebben v. Brock, Civil No. 85-589-A (S.D. Iowa filed July 17, 1985).
The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which provides that
"[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus
to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff."
Sebben v. Brock, Civil No. 85-589-A (S.D. Iowa Feb. 6, 1986)(order granting
motion to dismiss).
In re Sebben, 815 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1987).
11 Broyles v. Director, OWCP, 824 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct.
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II. THE SEBBEN DECISION
A five member majority of the Supreme Court upheld the
Fourth Circuit's decision on the applicability of Section 410.490
"with the clarification, however, that its opinion requires appli-
cation of criteria no more restrictive than Section 410.490 only as
to the affirmative factors for invoking the presumption of enti-
tlement, and not as to the rebuttal factors, the validity of which
respondents have conceded.''32
In the brief submitted to the Supreme Court on behalf of the
Secretary of Labor and the Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs, the Secretary argued that the word "criteria"
in Section 402(f)(2) of the Act refers to medical criteria used to
measure disability and does not prohibit the Secretary from de-
veloping distinct standards, such as the 10 year requirement, for
establishing causation.33 Because the disability criteria in Part 727
are no more restrictive than those in Section 410.490, the Secretary
reasoned that Section 410.490 is not applicable in Part C claims.1
4
The Secretary also argued that, even assuming that her construc-
tion of Section 402(f)(2) was erroneous, mandamus was not war-
ranted in the Eighth Circuit case because the Secretary did not
owe a clear, nondiscretionary duty to apply Section 410.490 and
because the plaintiffs, in failing to appeal their claims, had not
exhausted their administrative remedies."
The Courts rejected the Secretary's argument that the term
criteria in Section 402(f)(2) was restricted to "medical criteria.' '36
The Court held, however, that even if the Secretary's interpreta-
tion of the term was correct, the 10 year requirement in Part 727
still rendered the Secretary's interim criteria more restrictive than
the HEW interim criteria. 7 Nevertheless, the Court unanimously
reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision regarding mandamus, and
held that the Department of Labor was not required to reconsider
finally denied Part C claims.3"
1288 (1988) and consolidated with Pittston Coal Company v. Sebben, 108 S.Ct. 1011 (1988)
and McLaughlin v. Sebben, 108 S.Ct. 1011 (1988).
3 Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S.Ct. 414, 424 (1988).




6 Sebben, 109 S.Ct. at 420-21.
" Id. at 421.
I d. at 424-25. This case is now on remand before the District Court for the
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III. THE IMPACT OF SEBBEN AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES
In finding that a mandamus action did not lie, the Supreme
Court foreclosed reconsideration of perhaps as many as 94,00019
previously denied claims. Because of this there are a fairly limited
number of pending cases which will be directly affected by the
Sebben decision.4 The impact of the decision will also be lessened
by the fact that, prior to the Supreme Court's decision, only one
circuit which was presented with the issue had held Section 410.490
wholly inapplicable in Part C claims. 4' Nevertheless, the Sebben
decision has already generated substantial litigation by the claim-
ants' bar. While some of this litigation appears to be based on
confusion over the Court's holding, at least one important issue,
requiring further clarification of the "not more restrictive" direc-
tive in Section 402(f)(2), remains unresolved.
A. The Limits of Sebben
In order to clarify the Sebben holding, it may be helpful to
begin by describing the claims which will not be affected by the
decision. First, the decision will not affect claims filed after
January 1, 1980, the effective date of the final Part 718 regula-
tions. 42 The Sebben decision is based on the fact that Section
402(f)(2) of the Act requires the Secretary's interim regulations in
Part 727 to be "not more restrictive" than Section 410.490.
4
1
There is no similar statutory provision which requires that Part
Southern District of Iowa, Central Division. See supra note 27. On January 25, 1989, the
plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to allege that, in fact, the claims at issue in the
class action were never properly denied by the Department of Labor because the notice of
denial was faulty. On May 31, 1989, Judge W.C. Stewart denied the plaintiff's motion.
" Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit at 12, Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S.Ct. 414. On April 18, 1989,
Representative Miller of Calilfornia introduced legislation, entitled the Coal Miner's Justice
Act of 1989, which is designed to apply the Sebben holding to these tens of thousands of
previously denied claims. H.R. 2050, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). This bill, however, has
not generated a great deal of interest and seems unlikely to progress past the committee
stage.
,. In all, there are approximately 10,000 black lung claims filed before the effective
date of the Part 718 final regulations which are still pending. Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 39.
41 Strike v. Director, OWCP, 817 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1982).
Q: 20 C.F.R. § 718.2 (1983); Muncy v. Wolfe Creek Collieries Coal Co., 3 BLR (MB)
1-627 (BRB 1981).
43 Section 402(f)(2) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) and
Section 410.490, 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 (1988), are set forth fully supra at notes 14 and 24.
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718 be less stringent than the HEW interim regulation. Section
402(f)(1)(D) of the Act merely required the Secretary, in prom-
ulgating the permanent Part 718 standards, to develop "criteria
for all appropriate medical tests . . . which accurately reflect total
disability from [pneumoconiosis] in coal miners.""4 The intent
was that the Secretary enact more medically accurate standards,
not necessarily more liberal ones.
Second, careful analysis of Sebben makes it clear that the
decision has no direct bearing upon cases in which the miner has
10 or more years of coal mine employment. The thrust of the
Sebben holding is to insure that Part C claimants who filed
applications before January 1, 1980, have access to invocation
criteria as favorable as those contained in Section 410.490. 41 The
only instance in which the invocation provisions contained in
Section 410.440 afford a claimant any advantage over the provi-
sion in 20 C.F.R. Section 727.203(a) is when a miner with fewer
than 10 years of coal mine employment can establish pneumo-
coniosis by x-ray, autopsy or biopsy evidence, and can demon-
strate, through other evidence, that a causal relationship exists
between the pneumoconiosis and coal mine employment. Prior to
Sebben, if a Part C claimant was unable to show 10 years of coal
mine employment, then the claimant was not afforded the benefit
of the presumption. However, where a claimant could establish
10 or more years of coal mine employment and pneumoconiosis
by x-ray, autopsy or biopsy evidence, he or she was entitled to
invocation under 20 C.F.R. Section 727.203(a)(1). Similarly, a
claimant who had more than 10 years of coal mining and quali-
fying ventilatory studies was able to invoke the presumption of
total disability due to pneumoconiosis under Section 727.203(a)(2).
In each case, Part 727 affords a miner with at least 10 years of
coal mine employment the same opportunity for invocation as
provided by Section 410.490.4
In fact, the Court in Sebben explicitly recognized that it was
"central to the present case that under this interim regulation,
unlike the HEW regulation (Sections 410.490(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)), a
miner cannot obtain the first presumption of entitlement without
10 years of coal mine service." 47 To redress this inequality of
- 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)I)(D) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
41 Sebben, 109 S. Ct. at 421-22.
- See 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(i), (ii), (2).
, Sebben, 109 S. Ct. at 418-19.
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treatment, the Court required the application of Section 410.490
invocation criteria in such cases. 4
B. The Unresolved Issue: What Rebuttal Methods Remain
Available
Simply because the Sebben decision is not directly applicable
to cases involving 10 year coal mining histories is not to say that
the decision forecloses the application of Section 410.490 in such
cases. To understand why, it is necessary to consider the major
question left unresolved by Sebben. Put simply, that question is
whether Section 402(0(2) also mandates the application of the
rebuttal provisions contained in Sections 410.490(c)(1), (2). 49 The
rebuttal provisions of Section 401.490 only expressly allow rebut-
tal of the presumption through evidence that a miner was doing
or was able to do his coal mine work or comparable work.5 0 In
addition to these two methods of rebuttal, the Part 727 presump-
tion also provides for rebuttal through evidence showing that the
miner's disability did not arise out of coal mine employment or
that the miner did not have pneumoconiosis. 15 If the Section
410.490 provisions apply, rather than the arguably more expansive
rebuttal provisions contained in 20 C.F.R. Sections 727.203(b)(1)-
(4), claimants who have established 10 or more years of coal mine
service, but who are not working and are unable to work, may
be able to persuasively argue that they are entitled to have their
claim reconsidered under the HEW interim regulations. In fact,
the Seventh Circuit has recently been persuaded by this argument,
finding the Department of Labor's rebuttal provisions invalid as
more restrictive than the HEW provisions.12 As the Seventh Cir-
cuit recognized, its decision conflicts with Sixth Circuit decisions
,8 Id. at 424.
, For the text of the rebuttal provisions in 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(c), see supra note
14.
20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(1), (2) (1988).
20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3), (4) (1988).
Taylor v. Peabody Coal Company, No. 86-2590 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 1989). The
Taylor case involved a miner with 42 years of coal mine employment. Slip. op. at 9. The
court found that the Department of Labor rebuttal provisions violated the "not more
restrictive" mandate because these provisions allow the consideration of medical evidence
while the HEW provisions, in the court's view, do not. Slip. op. at 6. Thus, the court not
only invalidated the Department of Labor's subsection (b)(3) and (b)(4) rebuttal methods,
but also invalidated the (b)(2) method, finding that the nearly identical HEW rebuttal
method (20 C.F.R. § 410.490(c)(2)) actually requires that rebuttal be established through
vocational evidence and not merely medical evidence. Slip. op. at 3, 5.
1989-90]
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upholding the Department of Labor rebuttal provisions and find-
ing Section 410.490, therefore, inapplicable in cases involving 10
or more years of coal mine employment.13 The Third Circuit has
also recently addressed these issues and held all four rebuttal
provisions applicable. 4 These issues are also currently being con-
sidered in cases pending before the Fourth Circuit."
In the Sebben case, the Secretary acknowledged that if Section
410.490 restricts rebuttal to the two methods explicitly provided
in the regulation, then the Part 727 rebuttal methods are more
restrictive than those set forth in the HEW regulation.5 6 The
Secretary argued, nevertheless, that limiting rebuttal to the two
methods enumerated in Section 410.490 would disrupt the statu-
tory scheme57 and possibly violate the due process rights of coal
mine operators.58 The respondents in Sebben, however, had con-
ceded the validity of the rebuttal provisions.5 9 Because of this
concession, the Court declined to resolve the rebuttal question or
13 Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Company v. Miliken, 866 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1989)
(Sixth Circuit's decision in Kyle does not apply in claims involving 10 or more years of coal
mine employment and does not require application of § 410.490 rebuttal provisions in Part
C claims); Neace v. Director, OWCP, No. 86-3756 (6th Cir. June 15, 1989)(in this supple-
mental opinion, the Sixth Circuit indicated that Sebben might apply in Part B reopened
claims involving 10 year mining histories); Hall v. Consolidation Coal Company No. 88-
3725 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 1989)(following Miliken); Baker v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., No.
88-3986 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 1989)(following Miliken).
s, Beth Energy Mines, Inc. v. Pauley, No. 89-3364 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 1989).
Robinette v. Director, OWCP, No. 88-It14 (4th Cir. filed August 22, 1988); Elkins
v. Elro Coal Corp., No. 88-3659 (4th Cir. filed December 8, 1988); Dayton v. Consolidated
Coal Co., No. 89-3203 (4th Cir. filed January 9, 1989).
16 Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 25-26, Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109
S.Ct. 414 (1988)(No. 87-821).
Specifically, the Secretary argued that restricting rebuttal to the two explicit methods
in § 410.490(c) would run afoul of the statutory mandate in 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) that "all
relevant evidence shall be considered." Id. at 27.
m Id. at 26. The Secretary argued that limiting the rebuttal inquiry to the issue of
total disability would appear irrational since Congress enacted the Act to provide benefits
to miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employ-
ment. Mullins Coal Co., 108 S.Ct. at 431. Moreover, the Secretary referred to an earlier
Supreme Court decision in which the Court indicated, in dicta, that any regulation limiting
a coal mine operator's ability to rebut would not be authorized by the statute. Usery v.
Turner-Elkhorn Mining Co., 423 U.S. 1, 37 (196). In the Usery ase, the Court considered
the employer's objections to the ostensibly limited rebuttal allowed in Section 411(c)(4) of
the Act, but found it unnecessary to reach the due process argument because the Court
interpreted the language which the employers claimed limited rebuttal as applying only to
the Secretary and not to operators. Id. The Secretary, of course, could not independently
assert a due process violation.
" Sebben, 109 S. Ct. at 422-23.
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address the concerns of the Secretary regarding that issue. Spe-
cifically, the Court wrote:
Respondents' concession on the rebuttal provisions means that
we are not required to decide the question of their validity, not
that we must reconcile their putative validity with our decision
today. (The concession also means that we have no occasion to
consider the due process arguments of the petitioners, which are
predicated upon the proposition that the rebuttal provisions
must be more expansive than those in the HEW interim regu-
lation).60
1. One Solution: The Labor Regulation Is No More Restrictive
Than The HEW Regulation
Thus, the Sebben decision gives no guidance on this issue.
Unfortunately, there is also no case law which describes how the
Section 410.490 rebuttal provisions were actually applied by the
Social Security Administration. 61 The issue must be resolved,
therefore, through a careful examination of the rather obtuse
language of the regulation itself. 62
To facilitate this examination, is helpful to reiterate the re-
quirements of Section 410.490(b). First, in order to be eligible for
the presumption of total disability or death due to pneumoconi-
osis, a claimant is required to either establish pneumoconiosis by
x-ray, biopsy or autopsy evidence or establish 15 years of coal
mine employment and present qualifying ventilatory study evi-
60 Id. at 423.
6, One commentator has suggested that Congress was quite concerned with allegations
that the Social Security Administration invoked the § 410.490 presumption based on any
single item of qualifying evidence and then simply awarded benefits without considering any
rebuttal evidence. Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History Surrounding the
Black Lung Interim Presumption and a Survey of its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. RE.
869, 893 & n. 123 (1981) [hereinafter "A Critical Analysis"]. Their concern was reflected
in language in the Conference Report admonishing that "all relevant medical evidence be
considered." Id. at 893 citing H.R. REP. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 309-10. In another context, the Supreme Court had
indicated agreement with this analysis, writing that:
[tjo assure that [SSA's] problem [of failing to consider all relevant evidence]
would not infect adjudications under the new Labor interim presumption, the
requirement of 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) that all relevant medical evidence be
considered in adjudicating SSA claims was explicitly carried over into the
Labor presumption's rebuttal section.
Mullins, 108 S.Ct. at 435. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b) (1988).
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dence. In addition to meeting the medical requirements under
Section 410.490(b)(1), the regulation requires:
(2) The impairment established in accordance with paragraph
(b)(l) of this section arose out of coal mine employment (see
§§ 410.416 and 410.456).
(3) With respect to a miner who meets the medical requirements
in paragraph (b)(l)(ii) of this section, he will be presumed to be
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine
employment, or to have been totally disabled at the time of his
death due to pneumoconiosis arising out of such employment,
or his death will be presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis
arising out of such employment, as the case may be, if he has
at least 10 years of the requisite coal mine employment.
6 3
Finally, subpart (c) of the regulation provides that the presump-
tion may be rebutted by evidence that the miner is doing his usual
coal mine work or comparable work or by evidence that the miner
is able to do such work.
Section 410.490(b)(2) requires that the "impairment" estab-
lished under paragraph (b)(1) arose out of coal mine employment.
It seems clear that, despite its reference to "impairment," (b)(2)
actually requires that a claimant's "pneumoconiosis" arose out
of coal mine employment. In fact, both the Board64 and the Sixth
Circuit 65 have interpreted Section 410.490 in this manner. This
interpretation is bolstered by the parenthetical reference in Section
410.490(b)(2) to Sections 410.41666 and 410.45667, which provide
6 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(2), (3) (1988).
See, e.g., Foster v. Director, OWCP, 8 BLR (MB) 1-188 (BRB 1985)(Section
410.490 presumption could not be invoked where ALJ determined claimant's pneumoconiosis
did not arise out of coal mine employment); Thornton v. Director, OWCP, 8 BLR (MB)
1-277 (BRB 1985)(Section 410.490 presumption invoked where existence of pneumoconiosis
and its relationship to coal mine employment were conceded).
5 Johnson v. Director, OWCP, No. 88-3013, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 1988)
(unpublished) citing Grant v. Director, OWCP, 857 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1988).
20 C.F.R. § 410.416 (1988), in its entirety provides:
§ 410.416 DErERMINING ORIGIN OF 1PNEUTOCONOS1S, INCLU NG
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION.
(a) If a miner was employed for 10 or more years in the Nation's coal mines,
and is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis, it will be presumed, in the
absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, that the prieumoconiosis arose
out of such employment.
(b) In any other case, a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoco-
niosis, must submit the evidence necessary to establish that the pneumoconiosis
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that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a miner with 10
or more years of coal mine employment is entitled to the pre-
sumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine em-
ployment.6 These same regulations require a miner with fewer
than 10 years of coal mine employment, to affirmatively prove
the causal relationship between his coal mine employment and his
pneumoconiosis.69 Presumably, the drafters of Section 410.490(b)(2)
simply made reference to these provisions in order to clarify the
situations in which the claimant's pneumoconiosis will be found
to have arisen out of coal mine employment.
70
Thus, where a claimant with fewer than 10 years of coal mine
employment is asserting entitlement to benefits based on positive
x-ray evidence, Section 410.490(b)(2) places the burden on the
claimant of establishing that the miner's radiologically indicated
pneumoconiosis arose out of his coal mine employment. Under
Part 727, on the other hand, a claimant with x-ray evidence of
pneumoconiosis and the requisite length of coal mine employment
is not required to prove the relationship between his pneumoco-
niosis and his coal mine employment. Rather, under Section
arose out of employment in the Nation's coal mines. (See § 410.110(h), (i),
j), (k), (l), and (m)).
67 20 C.F.R. § 410.456 (1988) provides:
§ 410.456. DETERMINING ORIGIN OF PNEUMOCONIOSIS, INCLUDING
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION-SURVIVOR'S CLAIM.
(a) If a miner was employed for 10 years or more in the Nation's coal mines,
and suffered from pneumoconiosis, it will be presumed, in the absence of
persuasive evidence to the contrary, that the pneumoconiosis arose out of
such employment.
(b) In any other case, the claimant must submit the evidence necessary to
establish that the pneurnoconiosis from which the deceased miner suffered,
arose out of employment in the Nation's coal mines. (See § 410.110(b), (i),
(j), (k), (), and (m)).
I These sections implement the rebuttable presumption found in Section 411(c)(1) of
the Act, which provides, in relevant part:
(c) For purpose of this section -
(1) If a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed
for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment.
30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (1982).
20 C.F.R. §§ 410.416(b), .456(b)(1988).
70 In Sebben, the Supreme Court appears to have accepted this interpretation of the
parenthetical reference in § 410.490. In describing the manner in which the § 410.490
provision works, the Court wrote that "[tihe proof of causality required for this first
presumption was to be established under §§ 410.416 or 410.456, both of which accorded a
rebuttable presumption of causality to claimants with 10 years of mining service and also
permitted claimant's to prove causality by direct evidence." Sebben, 109 S.Ct. at 418 (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original),
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
727.203(b)(4), 71 the party opposing entitlement is allowed to rebut
the presumption through evidence proving that the miner does
not have pneumoconiosis.12 What is part of the rebuttal inquiry
under Part 727, therefore, is part of the invocation inquiry under
Section 410.490 where a miner has fewer than 10 years of coal
mine employment.
Even where a miner has more than 10 years of coal mine
employment, Section 410.490 may allow rebuttal through evidence
disproving the existence of pneumoconiosis. Given that Section
411 (c)(1) mandates the application of a presumption that a miner's
pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment,73 it is not
surprising that Section 410.490(b)(2) refers to and presumably
follows the permanent Part 410 regulations which implement the
presumption. This presumption is rebuttable according to the
express terms of both the statutory provisions74 and the imple-
menting regulations.75 Therefore, if Section 410.490 is intended to
follow the Part 410 regulations and adopt the Section 411(c)(1)
presumption, it should be interpreted as allowing rebuttal of the
presumption that the miner's pneumoconiosis arose out of coal
mine employment, through "persuasive evidence to the con-
trary." '76 This is equivalent to the rebuttal method contained in
Section 727.203(b)(4). 77 .
The Section 410.490 provision can also be interpreted as pro-
viding a rebuttal method equivalent to the method contained in
Section 727.203(b)(3). To reiterate, Section 410.490(c) explicitly
7- 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(4) (1988).
72 To rebut under subsection (b)(4), the party opposing entitlement must establish the
absence of pneumoconiosis as defined in the Act, including chronic pulmonary disease
resulting in respiratory or pulmonary impairment significantly related to or significantly
aggravated by dust exposure in coal mine employment. See, e.g., Pavesi v. Director, OWCP,
758 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1985); Biggs v. Consolidation Coal Co., 8 BLR 1-317, 320
(1985); see also 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1982); 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(4) (1988).
71 The presumption in Section 411(c)(1) has been held to apply to Part C as well as
Part B claims. Usery v. Turner-Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 24 (1976).
74 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (1982)("[T]here shall be a rebuttable presumption.")(emphasis
added).
1, 20 C.F.R. § 410.416 (1988)("... it will be presumed, in the absence of persuasive
evidence to the contrary ...1).
76 Because pneumoconiosis is defined by the Act and the regulations as including any
chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary
impairments, arising out of coal mine employment, evidence that a miner's pneumoconiosis
did not arise out of coal mine employment is also evidence that the miner does not have
statutory pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.110(o), 718.201,
727.202 (1988).
" For an explanation of rebuttal under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(4), see supra note 72.
[VOL. 5:93
1989-90] SEBBEN AND BLACK LUNG
allows rebuttal only through proof that a miner is not totally
disabled.7" However, like paragraph (b)(2), Section 410.490(c) also
parenthetically refers to another Part 410 regulation, Section
410.412(a)(1). 79 In turn, Section 410.412(a)(1) provides that a miner
will only be considered totally disabled if his pneumoconiosis
prevents his return to his usual coal mine employment or com-
parable employment.8s In a sense, this reference in Section
410.490(c) can be seen as definitional since it simply spells out
the situations in which the party opposing entitlement will be
deemed to have ruled out "total disability." In other words, to
give logical effect to the Section 410.412(a)(1) reference, Section
410.490(c) can be read as allowing rebuttal not only through
evidence ruling out total disability in the broad sense, but also,
more specifically, through proof that the miner's total disability
is not due to pneumoconiosis. The Director has argued for this
precise interpretation of the Section 410.490 rebuttal provisions.
8'
" Specifically, the party opposing entitlement may rebut through evidence that the
miner is doing his usual coal mine work or comparable work, 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(c)(1)
(1988), or evidence that the miner is able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable
work. 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(c)(2) (1988). The Act requires that a living miner be considered
totally disabled when pneumoconiosis prevents the miner from engaging in gainful employ-
ment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to any coal mine employment in which
the miner previously engaged with regularity over a substantial period of time. 30 U.S.C. §
902(f)(l)(A) (1982); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.412(a)(1), 718.204(b) (1988).
This regulation, in its entirety, defines total disability in the following manner:
(a) A miner shall be considered totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if:
(1) His pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful work in the
immediate area of his residence requiring the skills and abilities comparable
to those of any work in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with
some regularity and over a substantial period of time (that is, "comparable
and gainful work," see §§ 410.424 through 410.426); and
(2) His impairment can be expected to result in death, or has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
(b) A miner shall be considered to have been totally disabled due to pneu-
moconiosis at the time of his death, if at the time of this death:
(1) His pneumoconiosis prevented him from engaging in gainful work in the
immediate area of his residence requiring the skills and abilities comparable
to those of any work in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with
some regularity and over a substantial period of time (that is, "comparable
and gainful work," see §§ 410.424 through 410.426); and
(2) His impairment was expected to result in death, or it lasted or was expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
C.F.R. § 410.412 (1988).
This, of course, is consistent with the statutory definition of total disability con-
ed in 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(1) (1982). See supra note 78.
1, Response Brief for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
ted States Department of Labor at 19-23, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Smith, 699 F.2d
(8th Cir. 1983).
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If this analysis is correct, claimants do not receive any rebuttal
advantage under Section 410.490 regardless of the length of their
coal mine employment. A claimant with fewer than 10 years of
coal mine employment has the affirmative burden under Section
410.490(b)(2) of establishing that his pneumoconiosis arose out of
coal mine employment. A miner with more than 10 years is given
a presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine
employment, but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence
ruling out causation. Moreover, under the interpretation of Sec-
tion 410.490(c) described above, the party opposing entitlement
may also rebut by establishing that any disability from which the
miner suffers did not arise out of coal mine employment. There-
fore, Section 410.490 can be read as providing rebuttal methods
precisely analogous to those contained in Sections 727.203(b)(1)
through (b)(4).
Aside from the obvious complexity of this scheme, there is at
least one other major problem with this interpretation. Several
courts have already rejected a quite similar argument which the
Director made in reference to Section 727.203(b)(2). 2 This section,
like Section 410.490(c), also parenthetically refers to Section
410.412(a). The Director has argued that because Section
410.412(a)(1) defines total disability in terms of disability due to
pneumoconiosis, the party opposing entitlement under (b)(2) should
be able to rebut through evidence showing that any disability
from which the miner suffers is not due to pulmonary impairment.
However, the federal courts of appeals which have addressed the
issue have unanimously rejected the Director's position, holding
that there can be no rebuttal under Section 727.203(b)(2) if a
miner is totally disabled from any cause, whether or not that
disability is the result of a pulmonary or respiratory condition.83
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that the reference to Section
410.412(a) was merely to clarify what would be considered "com-
parable and gainful" work and was not designed to bring the
causation issue into question.84 It seems unlikely that these courts
will accept, in its new guise, the argument which they have
resoundingly rejected in reference to Section 727.203(b)(2) rebut-
u For the full text of 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(2) (1988), see supra note 21.
13 See, e.g., Oravitz v. Director, OWCP, 843 F.2d 738, 740 (3d Cir. 1988); York v.
Benefits Review Board, 819 F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir. 1987); Sykes v. Director, OWCP, 812
F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1987).
" Sykes, 812 F.2d at 894.
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tal. Of course, it is possible that a higher authority will be called
upon to resolve the issue.
2. A Second Solution: Congress Did Not Intend To
Limit The Part 727 Rebuttal Inquiry
A more compelling argument can be made that the "not more
restrictive" mandate was never intended to apply to or limit
rebuttal under Part C. The legislative history surrounding the
adoption of this provision, as well as the Act itself, lend some
support to this argument. First, Section 401(a)85 states that the
purpose of the Act is to provide benefits to eligible miners and
their dependents if the miner's total disability or death was due
to pneumoconiosis. Second, a miner is to be considered "totally
disabled" only if the miner's pneumoconiosis prevents him from
working.86 Regardless of what HEW had intended in enacting
Section 410.490, it would make little sense to presume that Con-
gress intended to statutorily limit the rebuttal inquiry to a deter-
mination of disability, since in some cases this would allow an
award of benefits despite clear evidence that a miner did not have
pneumoconiosis or that his disability was not related to his coal
mine employment. Finally, in discussing the requirement that the
Part 727 criteria be not more restrictive than the Section 410.490
criteria, the House Conferees explicitly qualified that requirement.
Specifically, the Conferees directed:
With respect to a claim filed or pending prior to the promul-
gation of such regulations, such regulations shall not provide
more restrictive criteria than those applicable to a claim filed
on June 30, 1973, except that in determining claims under such
criteria all relevant medical evidence should be considered in
accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary of Labor
and published in the Federal Register."1 (emphasis added)
One problem with attaching too much significance to this
expressed intent, however, is that the above-quoted language was
" 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1982).
30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(A) (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 309-10. In his article on the interim presumption, Mark Solomons argues that
"[bly this statement, the conferees alerted the Secretary of Labor that he was not to treat
the interim presumption as irrebuttable." A Critical Analysis, supra note 61 at 893.
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
not included in Section 402(f)(2) of the Act,88 although a similar
requirement that all relevant evidence be considered was included
in another statutory provision dealing, more generally, with enti-
tlement to benefits under Part C. 9 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court in Sebben seemed disinclined to read any limitations on
the word "criteria" based on the legislative history, finding that
"the text of the present statute plainly embraces criteria of more
general application. '"90 The Court reasoned that the "not more
restrictive" mandate should be construed broadly because "Con-
gress had no particular motive in preserving the HEW interim
medical criteria other than to assure the continued liberality of
black lung awards."91 However, as one commentator has noted,
because Congress was also concerned that the Social Security
Administration had improperly treated the Section 410.490 pre-
sumption as irrebuttable, Congress indicated, through their ad-
monition in the Conference Report that all relevant evidence be
considered, that they did not intend to restrict rebuttal of the
interim presumption.92 Perhaps, given the significantly different
legislative concern expressed by Congress in reference to rebuttal
of the interim presumption, and given the clear intent of the Act
to provide benefits, not to every disabled miner, but only to those
who are disabled due to pneumoconiosis, the courts will be willing
to limit the scope of the "not more restrictive" mandate in this
context.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion indicates, it is a close question
whether the application of all four rebuttal provisions in Section
727.203(b) is consistent with the Section 402(f)(2) mandate. Al-
though it is possible to interpret Section 410.490 as actually having
provided all four rebuttal methods, this interpretation is rather
complex and requires that arguably vague, parenthetical cross-
references be given a pivotal role in the analysis of Section 410.490.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Social Security
Administration simply was not interested in considering rebuttal
0 See supra note 61.
" Section 413(b) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n determining the validity of
claims under this part, all relevant evidence shall be considered." 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1982).
- Sebben, 109 S.Ct. at 421.
93 Id.
See supra notes 61 and 87.
[VOL. 5:93
SEBBEN AND BLACK LUNG
of the Section 410.490 presumption.93 It is in this context that
Congress acted and, as is often the case, its action reflected a
desire for both change and compromise. Indisputably, Congress
was concerned that the Department of Labor's approval rate was
significantly lower than the Social Security Administration's in-
terim approval rate. Congress was also concerned, however, that
the Social Security Administration had preemptively and, presum-
ably, incorrectly created an irrebuttable presumption. Given this
background, the statute can be read, without violence to its
language, as limiting the "not more restrictive" mandate to in-
vocation criteria. Because Congress explicitly created only one
irrebuttable presumption and, throughout the statute expressed
the intent to compensate not all miners, but only those who are
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, this reading would seem
warranted.
On balance, therefore, it is this commentator's opinion that
Section 402(f)(2) should be read as applying only to invocation
and not as blocking any of the rebuttal methods in Section
727.203(b). If all four rebuttal methods are available, claimants
with 10 or more years of coal mine employment could not receive
any possible advantage under Section 410.490. Under this analysis,
Section 402(0(2) merely mandates the application of the Section
410.490 invocation criteria in cases involving mining histories of
fewer than 10 years. Accordingly, the Sebben decision should be
understood as defining the only situation in which the provisions
of Section 410.490 are still viable.
91 See supra note 61.
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